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THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF STATE AS CONTROLLER AND
OWNER
The global market is largely a game without rules and without an arbitrator able to dispense
necessary medicine. Undoubtedly, the crisis has caused the emergence of new challenges, which
require the active role of the state in various areas. States play the role of owners of companies and
market regulators. Unfortunately governments were not performing these functions adequately.
Those therefore, who themselves committed many mistakes, must improve not just the mis-
functioning market, but also a defectively functioning state; or, to put it otherwise, they must
improve themselves.
1. The state as owner of companies
Ever faster changes, rapid capital flows, and financial crises make it necessary to bring the
question of what the state can and should do in such a changing world. For many years, a debate
has gone on in the world concerning the need for radical changes in our civilization. Repeating
crises intensify these discussions1. The neo-liberal system, quickly spreading as a consequence of
liberalization and deregulation, is viewed by many as a system that is not able to meet the
challenges  of  the  future.  It  is  a  system that  exceeds  the  limits  of  growth,  and  fosters  speculative
enrichment and growing social disparities.  Opinions about the end of capitalism (J. Rifkin) are
being expressed today, just as previously we heard about the "end of history" (F. Fukuyama).
Postulates to democratise globalisation or to globalise democracy (B. Barbier) appear, as do
postulates advocating anti-bourgeois revolutions (N. Klein) or the construction of "controlled
capitalism"  (J.Żakowski).  The  last  crisis  has  caused  a  widespread  call  for  the  establishment  of  a
super-supervisor of the financial market. The growing importance of financial markets, the
emergence of new institutions and financial instruments, and the development of speculative
capital are often cited as factors underlying the current difficulties of the global economy. These
are not just related to the current crisis, but also result from the increasing social and environmental
problems (exceeding the limits to growth has led to energy shortages and climate problems).
Reduction of the co-ordinatory capacity of markets, that expresses itself in recurrent crises,
requires consideration of whether these market failures can be addressed by specific actions of the
state. This question is even more reasonable when we take into account the fact that the state itself
is also largely contributed to the crisis2.
1 King 1992, Gore 1996, Tofler 1996, Stiglitz 2007
2 Some even speak about an excessive impact of the state: „The problem is not capitalism or excess of
capitalism, but rather a shortage of capitalism mixed with interventionism. Governments disturbed the
natural equilibrium of the market economy with subsidies, taxes, and various regulations. People who try to
manipulate capitalism are the main problem. Politicians, who instead of solving problems, decide to
increase debt and introduce even more regulations. His (Obama’s) reaction to growing debt and credit
2The  state  does  not  perform  a  good  job  as  an  owner,  market  regulator,  and  operator  of
monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policy. History provides many examples of irregularities
on the state. Defective framework for the financial sector, too, was designed by public
authorities. Excessive lending scale, detached from the size of the economy, was a
consequence of a specific monetary policy.
In many countries the state is the owner (co-owner) of many companies. Previously described
processes of nationalization make the increase of this role of the state possible. It should be
emphasized, however, that a number of negative consequences occurs, when the state acts as
owner.  I  do  not  want  to  say  that  the  State  may  not  be  the  owner  of  businesses,  or  that  state
ownership must always be irrational. Such a finding would be inherently wrong. My point here is
merely to indicate the existing serious threat.
In the case of state-owned enterprises all previously discussed irregularities in the functioning
of the supervisory boards manifest themselves. Thousands of jobs in state enterprises are
distributed among party activists or their families. Companies associated with politicians contracts
from companies controlled by the state. Such irregularities have occurred in many countries.
The situation, for example, in Polish state owned companies was rather well presented in
recently  completed  report  by  the  Supreme  Chamber  of  Control  (NIK,  a  state  control  institution
responsible to the parliament). In Nafta Polska (Polish Petroleum) from 2004 to 2008 seven people
had the job of CEO, and on average none of them worked more than a year. Similarly, in the plastic
company  Gamrat,  at  the  same  time  made  five  changes  in  the  board  took  place.  In  the  Nitrogen
Plant in Pulawy 12 executive searches were initiated. Problems with board members’ exchange
occurred in many other companies. In such circumstances there is no possibility of effective
governance, or of implementing any strategy. New CEO’s came with new ideas and employed new
“friends”. After working only a few months, many were paid out huge “farewell” checks. Another
example of mismanagement and lack of supervision may be the computerization of social security
Another problem is the improper selection of members of supervisory boards. In 2008 469
employees of the Ministry of the Treasury, or 67% of all employees, sat in one or two boards.
Often they were appointed to boards of companies that were controlled by the very same
departments in which they worked, which bluntly put means, that they controlled themselves.
Supervisory board appointments were made in order to grant them an additional salary, without any
respect for the actual needs of companies or their qualifications.
Various irregularities were detected by NIK in every third company controlled, while losses
from improper supervision have been valued at five hundred million zlotys. This loss is in my
opinion very underestimated. Only what could be easily counted was taken into account. The
effects of inadequate supervision or lack thereof can be much larger and appear over many future
years.
Another example is the ineffectiveness of State Social Security system, and especially the
computerization of the institution, which already cost more than sending probes to Mars. The
contract cannot be dissolved, and Social Security is not even the owner of the software source
code, which it bought. This institution works like it had neither management nor supervisory
boards at all. But the State does not care very much and, moreover, proposes to limit the transfer of
funds for future retirees to private pension companies, and direct them to the State Social Security3.
The institution is considered by many to be bankrupt.
dependency was even more debt and credit... this is just make-up covering greater problems in the future.”
Interview with Peter Schiff, Super Express, October 29, 2009.
3 It is interesting to note, that such proposals are being made by the Minister of Labor designated by the
Peasant Party PSL – a Party that over the last decades has valiantly defended KRUS (Agriculturers’ Social
Security),  a  very  ineffective  and  extremely  costly  (for  the  urban  taxpayers)  pension  system  for  the
agricultural sector which pays almost no taxes or social security premiums at all.
3These same problems occurred for a long time. So far it has not been possible to create
mechanisms that would have eliminated them. The only solution to these problems was, as before,
privatisation of enterprises. But that does not always solve problems, often different and bigger
ones appear.
2.  The  impact  of  capital  market  on  changing  the  state's  role  -
restrictions in conducting of monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate
policies
The last crisis has caused increased state intervention in many countries. Previously, in many
regions of the world the role of the state was being reduced. State intervention was limited, state
planning eliminated or reduced, the importance of market mechanisms increased. Functions of the
state shifted from control of economic processes towards creating the conditions for competition
and development. This is a consequence of the dominance of liberal theories. Despite the almost
universal awareness that the market is unable to cope with all the problems of today's world, quite
often the negative consequences of state intervention in the economy are emphasised. It is often
indicated that, with state intervention, thing would go from bad to worse.
In the period of globalisation, the state has lost much of its traditional role. The state's role in
shaping foreign economic relations has changed, for instance. Countries with open economies must
have an economic policy that takes account of external conditions. Economic policies aimed at
ensuring macroeconomic stability, low inflation, controlled budget deficit, balance of payments are
restricted, as is the interest rate and exchange rate policy4.
Investment decisions and directions of the flow of capital are largely contingent upon the
macroeconomic situation of the country or region5. Very high mobility on modern capital markets
means that governments find it increasingly difficult to conduct monetary policy. There may be
situations where it will be difficult to determine the country of origin of the majority of financial
institutions. As suggested by some, however, this is of little importance vis-à-vis the prospect of
achieving maximum profits6.  It is the capital having the choice that dictates conditions to which
countries must adapt if they want the capital to flow in.
Mainly less developed countries, and less stable politically, must compete for capital. Their
shortcomings (increased risk of the investment) must be compensated with lower taxes or lower
social burdens. Low competitiveness of many economies and the accompanying high investment
risk leads to an increase in interest rates on the debt issued by them (interest rate must compensate
for high risk). The consequence is an increase in market interest rates and reduction of resources
available to the companies (crowding-out effect). In addition, inflowing foreign capital leads to
currency appreciation. In such circumstances, little is needed to bring about a sudden capital flight.
The opening of capital markets means that monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policy is subject
to external verification. Lack of financial discipline, populist decisions and simple mistakes cause a
loss of confidence of foreign investors. In such a situation speculative attacks can easily occur. The
effect of the interest rate, the basic instrument of monetary policy, is increasingly conditioned by
4 Globalizacja, mechanizmy i wyzwania, edited by B. Liberska, PWE 2002, p. 34.
5 Investors’ decisions are largely affected by the assessments of the rating agencies, which critically
evaluate monetary, financial and fiscal policies. Politicians’ mistakes, irresponsible behavior, or public
statements may destabilise financial markets, leading even to severe crises. Building investors’ confidence
is a lengthy process, while it is very easy to lose this confidence.
6 On all the levels the systemic error underlying global integration makes itself evident: while the flow of
goods and capital is globally available, regulation and control remain a prerogative of the nation-state.
Economy devours politics. (H.P. Martin, H. Schumann, op.cit., s. 253).
4changes in interest and exchange rates in foreign markets. Conducting monetary policy is
becoming more complex. The effects of decisions made are less certain and more difficult to
predict.
Nation-states increasingly lose control over financial flows and their own economic policies,
while they become more and more subject to competitive pressures for further growth in
deregulation and liberalization. According to Dahrendorf, incontrollable processes on the financial
markets increasingly cause instability and chaos7. Under the influence of the iron grip of the new
"Capitalist International" entire countries and their social structures waver in their foundations8.
Threatening  to  flee,  the  capital  enforces  drastic  tax  breaks,  subsidies  or  free  billions  in
infrastructure. Alone, no nation is able to resist this pressure.
According to H. Martin and H. Schumann deregulation instead of state supervision, trade and
capital market liberalisation, and privatisation of public enterprises became a strategic weapon of
governments professing their faith in the market and of the international economic organizations
controlled by them (IMF, WTO). Armed with these arguments, they joined the fight for freedom
for capital, which continues to this day9.
Most countries in the world try to attract foreign investors by creating a favourable environment
for business. There are also those that are not conducive to entrepreneurs. According to a report by
the World Bank, Poland is such a country. In 2009 it took the 153rd place among the 183 countries
evaluated.  A  year  earlier,  it  had  a  slightly  better  position  –  142nd.   The  World  Bank  rating  was
mainly focused on tax issues: in Poland, the business operator had to pay 40 different taxes, as
opposed to 12 in the Czech Republic and 16 in Germany.
Table 1. Examples of countries in the ranking
Ireland Denmark Poland Belarus
Ranking 6 13 151 183
The total tax rate 9 9 40 107
Number of tax payments per year 76 135 395 900
Time spent on tax formalities (in
hours per year)
26.5 29.2 42.5 99.7
Source: World Bank Report, 2009.
Countries that until recently have sought to encourage domestic companies must stop these
actions, because they distort competition by the unequal treatment of entities. At the same time
wishing to attract foreign capital, they must support foreign investors, worsening competitive
conditions for local businesses. Many entities that benefited from state subsidies, lost it, and instead
had to face increased competition are often supported by their own states.
The crisis, however, led to emergence of various protectionist trends. Some countries have tried
to link public assistance provided by them with requirements such as maintaining production in the
country of origin at the expense of reducing production in other countries. France, for instance,
gives a good example of such approach. Renault, which received 4 billion euros in state aid, was
forced to desist from assigning the production of a new Clio to its plant in Turkey and to maintain
production in France. That decision led to losses in Turkey, Spain and Slovenia. French Economy
Minister  also  announced  that  the  country  might  increase  its  stake  in  Renault  to  20%   (it  was
previously 15%) in order to increase the impact it has on the decisions of the group. Renault's
production plans, in his view, are a political issue and the last word belongs to the President of
France.
7 R. Dahrendorf, Nieświęte przymierze, „Polityka” 1998, No. 9.
8 H.P. Martin, H. Schumann, op.cit., p.12.
9 Ibidem.
5Increasing openness of the economies and growing capital flows make it difficult to have a
fiscal policy uninfluenced by international circumstances. Fiscal policy affects investment
decisions. It is increasingly difficult to determine where the tax liability arises when capital and
production are on the move. Globally operating businesses have managed to involve many
countries in the world into a "contest of tax systems". Since different countries compete to attract
investment, they are left with no choice but cutting taxes. This leads to the governments are their
autonomy in decisions concerning the tax rates, as they always have to take the reaction of the
owners of surplus capital into consideration10. Not all countries lend themselves to this pressure11.
It is worth noting, however, that tax cuts do not have to automatically lead to an increase in foreign
investment. They are just one of many elements affecting the expected rate of return for investors.
Various studies show that stability of regulations and legal protection for investors is more
important for them, than some differences in taxes.
Many governments have reduced corporate taxation in recent years and introduced various
investment incentives as well, and this has encouraged foreign investors to allocate capital in their
country. The costs associated with it, however, were passed on to individuals. In many countries,
taxes on individuals remain at high levels. A strong progressive tax led to the outflow of domestic
capital and, therefore, Sweden for instance, has significantly reduced the scale of progression.
As is clear from a KPMG report, the crisis slowed down the decline in income tax rates on large
companies. The average tax rate on income of companies decreased from 32.69% in 1999 to
25.51% in 2009. Some countries have recently even increased taxes. Lithuania raised the income
tax from 15 to 20% and the VAT was raised in Ireland from 21 to 21.5% in Hungary from 20 to
25%, in Estonia from 18 to 20%, in Latvia from 18 to 21%, Lithuania from 18 to 19%.
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10 President Chirac defined the entire financial sector as a vicious lot, and the broker caste as the „AIDS of
world economy” („The Economist”, October 7, 1995). Tietmeyer, Chief of the Bundesbank said in 1996
during the World Economic Forum at Davos, that most politicians still do not realise how much they are
controlled, or even steered, by the financial markets  („Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung”, February 3,
1996).
11 In some countries an opposite process may be observed. Poland is among the exceptions. Despite
lowering the corporate income tax to a flat 19%, many other taxes and fees went up. The number of
changes in the tax regulations only leads to the conclusion that no “sane” investor should ever invest here.
Rapid changes in regulations make reliable analysis and investment risk assessment virtually impossible.
Poland is becoming ever less friendly for both domestic and foreign investors, which is visible in various
rankings.
6In the 1960s and early 1970s in most developed countries the share of budget expenditure in
GDP increased. Since the early 1980s the increase occurred mainly in continental European
countries; at the same time this share declined in the U.S. and Britain. In Europe, the highest share
of budget expenditures is in the Scandinavian countries (e.g. Sweden, approximately 60%) and
lowest in Ireland (33%). In the 10 new EU member states this share is on average 42%12.  At the
beginning of 21st century in most OECD countries there has been a decline in the share of taxes
and spending in GDP.
There are significant differences in the structure of budget revenues in each country. In Europe
the main source of revenue is VAT and excise, and the United States, Canada and Australia -
income taxes. The differences also apply to compulsory social insurance contributions charged to
labour costs. In Europe they are higher than in the United States. The lowest premiums (less than
15%) are in China, India, Indonesia, and Brazil. The highest (above 35%) in Germany, Belgium,
Hungary and Italy.  Significant differences also exist in the structure of expenditure.
The tax system has a major impact on capital market development. Taxes influence investing
entities, entities that seek access to financial resources, and financial intermediaries. Because of
differences in taxation between countries, there is no level playing field. At the same time
opportunities for tax evasion increase. Excessive fiscal stringency undermines incentives to save,
invest and work, increases transaction costs and the level of risk associated with making and
business13.  There is, however, no automatism. At the beginning of the process of globalisation it
was thought that this process would benefit mainly rich countries. Today it can be seen that less
developed countries can also profit from this. The country that benefited most from globalisation is
China. Until recently, it was often stressed that globalisation is a threat to fragile states, but for the
efficient and disciplined ones it creates opportunities for faster economic development. In light of
recent events this opinion should be reconsidered carefully. If we assume that a fragile country is a
country that conducts irresponsible policies, as the U.S. in recent years do, then the opinion is still
valid.
Investment attractiveness of the country significantly impacts investment risk. This risk is
dependent on many factors. Macroeconomic performance, financial equilibrium, creditworthiness,
access to bank financing, access to capital markets and stable regulations to protect the interests of
investors, inter alia, are all important factors. For many institutional investors, liquidity of the
portfolio understood as the ability to quickly exit from the investment in a situation of rapid
deterioration of the situation in a given country or region, or due to increased spending and demand
for free resources (e.g., the need for redemption of units discontinued by the funds), has the
greatest importance. Little or nothing must be done to make the negative effects of an investment
reveal themselves. By contrast, taking advantage of the opportunities usually requires effort,
thought and consistent action.
As shown by past experience, one of the consequences of crises was an increase in the deficit in
public finances.
Table 2 Central budget deficits relative to GDP
Country, year of crisis Deficit a year before
the crisis
The highest deficit
(year)
Increase (- decrease)
deficit
Argentina, 2001 -2.4 -11.9 (2002) 9.5
Chile, 1980 4.8 -3.2 (1985) 8.0
Colombia, 1998 -3.6 -7.4 (1999) 3.8
Finland, 1991 1.0 -10.8 (1994) 11.8
Indonesia, 1997 2.1 -3.7 (2001) 5.8
12 J.W. Bossak, op.cit, SGH, Warszawa 2006, p. 256.
13 Ibidem, p. 261.
7Japan, 1992 -0.7 -8.7 (1999) 9.4
Korea, 1997 0.0 -4.8 (1998) 4.8
Malaysia, 1997 0.7 -5.8 (2000) 6.5
Mexico, 1994 0.3 -2.3 (1998) 2.6
Norway, 1987 5.7 -2.5 (1992) 7.9
Spain, 1977 -3.9 -3.1 (1997) -0.8
Sweden, 1991 3.8 -11.6 (1993) 15.4
Thailand, 1997 2.3 -3.5 (1999) 5.8
Source: C. M. Reinhart, K. S. Rogoff, The Aftermath of Financial Crises, San Francisco, 2009.
Financial assistance by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank was dependent on
the fulfilment of a number of conditions including: lower inflation, reduced taxes, reduced budget
deficit, reduced subsidies to enterprises, removal of regulations restricting the free market. These
recommendations have largely led to reducing the role of the state. The outbreak of the crisis in
2008 brought about a curious effect: that those who until recently postulated diminishing the role of
the state, began - rather recklessly - pumping huge amounts of money into the economy, not really
thinking about the consequences. They wanted to stop what is inevitable anyway.
Decisions  taken  by  various  countries  to  reduce  the  impact  of  the  current  crisis  are  similar  to
those  taken  by  Japan  10  years  earlier.  Monetary  and  fiscal  policy  instruments  were  used.   The
greater concern is rather the U.S. than European countries, because of the limitations set up in
Maastricht.
Fight  with the crisis  has increased the share of  public  expenditure relative to GDP. In the old
EU countries this ratio is now higher than in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
Chart 2.  Expenditure of states in 2009, as % of GDP
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The planned budget deficit of the United States in 2010 reached 1.6 trillion U.S. dollars. Over
the last decade, government expenditure in the U.S. rose twice. Credit rating agencies lower the
ratings of more and more indebted countries (Greece, Portugal and others). Growing budget
deficits may lead to a global fiscal crisis.
8One of the major questions that arise here concerns the fairness of spending billions of dollars
on rescuing reckless investors and companies, who stood on the verge of bankruptcy. Supporters of
this approach argue that it protected the world from a far deeper crisis, saved jobs, etc. Opponents
indicate that no problem has been solved; only time was bought. The increased debt carried by
states will be an enormous challenge (burden) in coming years. According to prof. S. Hanke the
fatal reaction in Washington has changed, "a painful but short-lived recession into, perhaps, a
several years long permanent crisis14. In his opinion, in the absence of government support the
market alone would solve the problem. Unprepared and chaotic moves, and making people scared,
undermined confidence in the market and the crisis deepened.  Aid extended by the government to
insolvent borrowers could lead to even greater problems (increase in the deficit, internal debt,
inflation). By helping banks, insurance companies and automotive industries the government put
itself in a position, that will make it difficult to refuse assistance to individual borrowers, who can
not afford to repay the growing loan instalments.
Looking at various measures adopted in recent months (e.g., "injecting" 130 billion U.S.$. into
AIG), one can have doubts about the effectiveness of such actions. It is certainly not conducive to
reducing systemic risk15; to the contrary, systemic risk is increased as companies are encouraged to
behave just as before. One could say that AIG is an institution that is too big to fail. If, however,
such institutions are not allowed to fail, excessive leverage, or excessive speculation, will not be
reduced in the future.
The negative experience with state intervention has led many to conclude that the lesser the role
of the state, the better. It does not appear, however, that such a conclusion is fully justified16. Please
note that the absence of state in the economy could be as damaging as an excess of it17. In view of
increasing costs and risks associated with globalisation, there is a need to increase the role of the
state in order to decrease the adverse effects of this process. In the economy, when the state is
omnipotent, as well as when its role is unduly limited, anarchy, risk, and transaction costs increase
and the economic activity of society is reduced18. If state intervention helps to increase
accumulation, employment, productivity, entrepreneurship and innovation, then the country does
not limit economic freedom, but increases it (for example, Japan after 1949). The state should not
substitute for the market, but to steer (regulate) it in the direction of boosting entrepreneurship and
structural change19.
In my opinion, state support was necessary, but poorly executed.  Nothing was done to
eliminate at least some irregularities. Even a well thought out support, but carried out by only one
country, is ineffective. Additionally, please note that administering the medicine to one segment of
the economy may move the problems into other segments. The  attempt  was  to  fight  only  the
effects, not causes. Effects of these activities are already visible. The speculative bubble begins to
grow again. Managers benefiting from state aid continue to pay themselves huge bonuses, as if
there was no crisis  and nothing happened.  Government  action is,  for  them, an incentive to repeat
14 „Rząd zawsze może zrobić coś głupiego” („The government can always do something stupid”), Gazeta
Wyborcza, November 17, 2008r.
15 The AIG Group issued hundreds of billions of dollars of mostly unsecured Credit Default Swaps
(obligation to repay debt due to the second party to the transaction).
16 „In contemporary capitalism the state is an active participant of economic processes everywhere, and to a
greater degree than in the past, and in countries aiming to develop quickly the need for such activity is
particularly strong. This is not contrary to market economy principles”.  – Z. Sadowski, Polityka
długofalowego rozwoju kraju a akcesja do Unii Europejskiej, Warszaw 2002, p. 7.
17 H. Chołaj, op.cit., p. 422.
18 These are the conclusions of the World Bank (Word Development Report 2001, Building Institutions for
Markets). F. Fukuyama has a similar approach, Budowanie państwa. Władza i ład międzynarodowy w XXI
wieku, Rebis, Poznań 2005.
19 J.W. Bossak, op.cit., p. 40.
9what they did before the crisis. To simplify the problem, one could say that no matter what they do,
they will still get their bonus. Only the paymaster changes.
The state has an important role to play in the economic and social development. However, the
scope and direction of the impact of the state must change. The state should be more effective and
less expensive. An efficient state20 is needed, inter alia, to introduce regulations and institutions
that will allow for more appropriate market development and improving welfare of the population.
The state is necessary to implement appropriate foundations for the market. The absence of such
foundations increases the uncertainty and increases transaction costs.
3. Institutional determinants of capital market efficiency – actions of
the state to limit agency costs
The economic system of the country is part of the institutional system of state21. Various
institutions are the foundation of order and social harmony. The modern economy could not
function effectively without civil law, legal protection of creditors, regulation of companies, etc.
However, the excess of the institutions (the state) may limit the freedom, activity and
entrepreneurship. Institutions define the limits of acceptable behavior, define the limits of the
economic game and enforce compliance at the same time.
The task of state institutions and public entities in the economic sphere is primarily to ensure the
protection of property rights, freedom of economic activity and competition, promoting
entrepreneurship, growth, employment and economic equilibrium22. The development of
entrepreneurship depends on the degree of openness or restrictiveness of the law and the degree of
compliance.  Properly operating institutions created by the state are conducive to the reduction of
transaction costs and risk. The operation of the businesses generates costs of acquiring information,
of ensuring transparency, promotion costs, and other costs related to the economic system23. High
transaction costs occur when institutions perform poorly.
Determination of an adequate role of the state is one of the most difficult problems that arise in
the process of globalisation24. The macroeconomic policy is a very important issue; it should be
shaped so as to foster economic growth. The budget deficit and inflation must be reduced.
Whenever a deficit occurs, it is important how it is financed. In constructing the budget, it is of
paramount importance to have the share of fixed expenditure not too high. This increases
flexibility. A budget should also include off-budget operations. This will make better assessment of
government finances possible25.
In  discussions on the role  of  the state,  demands appear  to  increase or  reduce its  role.  Such an
approach leads to many misunderstandings. One should rather focus on the efficiency of state,
20 It is important to note, that there is a difference between the normative and the positive role of the state,
or – to put it  otherwise, between what the state should do to create conditions increasing the welfare of a
society, and what it in fact does. (R. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance, 1959). The supporters of an
increased role of the state see the normative role, whire their opponents are likely to look at the problem
from the point of view of the positive (or rather, negative) role of the state. Looking at different countries
trying  to  adapt  to  new  challenges  one  has  the  impression,  that  the  problem  lies  not  with  the  lack  of
possibilities, but with the lack of willingness to adapt, combined with swimming against the current.
21 J.W. Bossak, op.cit, p. 19.
22 Ibidem, p. 23.
23 K. Schenk, Economic Institutions and Complexity, Structures, Interactions and Emergent Properties,
„Journal of Evolutionary Economics” May 2005, Vol. 15, p. 13.
24 H. Chołaj, op.cit. p. 424.
25 Poland is, again, a negative example. Instead of concentrating on the sanation of public finance, the
entire effort goes into activities only apparently reducing debt. That is i.e. the underlying reason behind the
proposals to grab a part of resources from pension funds and transfer them to state social security. Instead
of reforming the agricultural pension system, very disadvantageous actions are proposed.
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rather than its strength. It is often indicated that the resources limited as a result of tax competition
do not allow the state to play an active role. Many actions, however, do not require, in my opinion,
additional funds. Often more efficient use of resources already held suffices26.
A new market order may be built only when the market and competition will work under a
certain institutional framework (legal and ethical rules). Markets must meet certain conditions.
Please note, however, that coordination must not be excessive. The state should reduce any
imperfections, both its own, and the market’s. The role of the state must be complementary with
the role of the market.
In considerations concerning the role of the state, two basic functions are usually identified:
operational and systemic27. The operational function relates to direct state interference in economic
activity. Within the systemic function, the state serves as a creator, supervisor and manager of the
economic system. Creating institutions which support the functioning of the market and
enterprises, improving the quality of resources and capacity is most important. It is necessary to
develop a long-term economic strategy. There is therefore no question of limiting the functions of
the state, but only of a change in approach. According J.H. Dunning, the State should restrict the
operational functions (be "leaner"), reduce red tape (be "flexible"), and take systemic actions
(creation of new institutions and regulations).
When pointing to the weakness of the state in carrying out its stabilising functions, several
causes are often given:
- delays in the monetary mechanism,
- crowding out effect,
- political business cycle,
- inflation expectations,
- real business cycle28.
The problem is that there is a growing a gap between the increased role that the State has to
play, and the possibilities of its fulfilment. The World Bank report on the world economy indicates
the applicability of two-part strategy29:
- The role of the state should be adapted to the possibilities. Countries that are trying to do too
much, having too small resources, often do more harm than good.
- The capacity of the state should be increased by strengthening public institutions. Effective
rules should be introduced, arbitrariness avoided, and corruption fought.
The main impact of state should concentrate on regulations, especially those that limit the scale
of operations, which are outside the sphere of the real economy, including excessive leverage and
taking excessive risks. This should not, however, lead to excessive growth of the role of state, to
unnecessary development of new controlling institutions. Solutions combining the good sides of
the market with necessary state intervention where the market cannot cope should be sought.
Many statements on the causes of crises often point to the ineffectiveness of prudential
regulations. This leads to the logical conclusion that these regulations should be changed
(tightened). The majority of the proposals going in this direction. When regulating different areas
26 Public expenditure in OECD countries in the early 1970s stood at 32% of GDP, in 1990 rose to 41%, and
in 1998 to 43%. The mean yearly GDP growth was 3.4% in the 1970s, 2.9% in the 1980s, and 2.4% in the
1990s. At the same time countries whose public expenditure did not exceed 25% of their GDP developed at
a yearly rate of 6.6%.: A. Piński, J. Piński, Belka pod nogami. Jak zniechęcano nas do przedsiębiorczości,
„Wprost”, September 12, 2004.
27 J.H. Dunning, Goverments and Macro-Organization of Economic Activity, w: Goverments, Globalization
and International Business, New York 1977.
28 A.Lipowski, Ekonomiczna zawodność państwa-krytyczna analiza ujęcia antyetatystycznego, Ekonomista
2/2002, Warszawa, p. 170.
29 World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World, Oxford University Press for the World
Bank, New York 1997.
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of market activity it should be borne in mind, however, that regulation turns off the natural market
forces. And when these rules fail, it is often proposed that further regulation be introduced. Such an
approach is, in my view, questionable, and for a number of reasons. First of all, causes of the crisis
are much more complex. Second, a number of attempts to tighten restrictions proved ineffective
(new instruments to circumvent new regulations were devised). Thirdly, it leads to various adverse
effects (reduction in capital inflows, or increase the cost of capital).
The basic problem boils down to the fact that a number of specific solutions currently proposed
were already attempted. Problems arising in different countries resulted in the imposition of
various restrictions on the movement of capital. However, this did not bring the desired effect. This
concerns for example the so-called Tobin tax, the taxation of short-term capital market operations,
or prohibition or restriction on short sales. Attempts to administrative reduce speculative capital
flows30 (restoring restrictions on transactions previously liberalized), undermined confidence in the
authorities' policy, increasing the risk in this country. This resulted in reducing capital flows, while
making it  difficult  for  companies to  access  capital,  and increasing the cost  of  its  acquisition.  The
new role of the state certainly cannot be confined to the role of caretaker31 of the new order, if only
because the new order does not yet exist. Swift action is needed.
In my opinion, improving market efficiency and reducing the negative impact of the market on
the  functioning  of  the  businesses  requires  an  active  role  of  the  state,  but  you  have  to  do  it  in  a
thoughtful and comprehensive manner (taking into account the different situations and reasons.) Do
those, who have to decide about these changes, have enough courage and wisdom to admit that
they are accomplices who led to the present  situation? A brain is  needed to admit  this,  to  realize
what the real causes of instability are, and what are the consequences of your actions. Can
regulators, while attacking speculators and shortsighted managers and capital markets, break away
from populism and short-term political objectives?  A good example of such populism is, for
example, the attempt to administratively reduce excessive salaries of managers. These salaries,
undoubtedly in many cases, are obscenely excessive and unrelated to the results, but the currently
proposed way of resolving this problem is in my view inappropriate. The main problem is not high
salaries, but excessive risk-taking incentive, and detachment of the motivating system from the
long-term results. There is no doubt that often the salary and bonuses are obviously too high, as
evidenced by the many previously described examples. It's hard to imagine, however, that the state
defines the level of wages and the amount of bonuses paid. Punishing anyone who got a bonus of
more than 25 thousand euros or pounds is not the solution. We must look for systemic solutions.
Proposals  to  place  “caps”  on  wages  appear  often,  but  I  do  not  think  that  it  is  an  appropriate
solution32. Another example of such populist measures such are the so-called “parities” in the
supervisory boards. In 2003 Norwegians introduced a requirement, that women should constitute
40% of supervisory boards’ members. Similar solutions were adopted in Spain, but they will not be
in force until 2015. The third country is France, where companies were given six years for the
30 For example, in Chile, mandatory non-interest bearing deposits equalling 30% of the value of financial
investments made there by a foreign entity were introduced. Another limitation was the requirement that
the capital flowing to remain in this country at least a year. In some countries, using tax preferences for
capital gains, these are restricted only to long-term investments.
31 Neo-liberals represented by Milton Friedman and Friedrich August von Hayek believed that the state
should only be a night guardian. There is a certain evolution of views, particularly with regard to
Friedman.
32 Poland has considerable experience in restricting wages of boards in state-owned firms. As these wages
are not linked with the size of companies, the difficulty in the management, or results achieved results
achieved, the jobs often go to losers, who are unable to find better paid positions  in private companies.
Different ingenious methods to circumvent these restrictions have been devised. Another anomaly is that
the board members of such companies may earn significantly less than their subordinates who are not
covered by this law.
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introduction of “parity”. If you do not do this, all the decisions of boards will be void. At least one
woman has to appear in every council at the next exchange of the boards.
A basic condition for the effectiveness of any solution is to understand the causes of
irregularities. G. Sorman argued that the deregulation of financial markets brought about mainly an
increase in speculation and therefore there is a need to establish rules according to totally new
principles33. This thinking does not give opportunities to develop appropriate solutions. One-
sidedness in the approach to the role of capital market leads nowhere. It is clear that the capital
market  is  imperfect,  and the state  as  a  regulator  of  this  market  is  imperfect  too.  Just  as  different
solutions on the capital market led to a crisis, the state has also participating in provoking it.
The problem is also that many borrowers and investors, especially individual have a very low
level of knowledge. Many of them are simply illiterate, and do not understand what they sign. Very
often they do not read the documents they sign. A number of vendors take advantage of this.  The
behavior of these sellers is unethical, but charging them with sole responsibility is not appropriate.
Those who want "a free ride34 also must bear responsibility for their mistaken decisions. I am fully
aware  that  sometimes  it  is  very  difficult  to  read  a  large  number  of  annexes  to  the  contracts,  the
small print, or very extensive tables of fees and commissions. However, this may not be the basis
for shifting responsibility to others.
The European Commission has concluded that such investors should be given extra help and
issued the MiFID directive.  Under this directive the seller of financial products should be assess
the investor profile in a detailed survey, and determine the suitability of the service proposed. The
investor takes the final decision anyway. Will this change the situation significantly? I do not think
so. Those who mindlessly invested will continue to do so. Without imposing liability for the
decisions taken at three levels (managers, state and investors) the volatility in capital markets
cannot be reduced.
 Below I present schematically the causes of instability of capital markets. Creating the
conditions for a safe capital market depends primarily on creating the basis of stable functioning
and development of individual countries. Capital market development requires the active role of
the state. This applies mainly to establishing specific regulations to ensure the safety of this market.
The following factors have a great significance:
- regulations defining the principles and procedures of public trading in securities (regulations
concerning the preparation of prospectuses in public offerings and the scope of the periodic
information, regulating the secondary market and settlements)
- institutional arrangements, to ensure fair trading and competition (the licensing of stock
exchanges, brokers, investment advisers, investment funds)
- actions to ensure the smooth functioning of the securities market and protect participants of
this market (a system of civil and criminal liability)
- confidence in the public trading of securities on a given capital market.
Several  areas  of  activity  may  be  indicated.  The  first  priority  is  to  create  conditions  for  better
access to reliable information and introduction of appropriate corporate governance. This depends
primarily on creating appropriate regulations and institutions to disclose important information,
providing equal access to information, implementing international accounting standards and
protecting the interests of different shareholders. Protection of small shareholders must be
increased, corporate management improved, international accounting standards - disseminated.
Consideration must be given to the issue of determining the values of individual assets and their
impact  on  financial  statements.  An  important  area,  which  also  should  be  regulated,  is  the  credit
33 G.Sorman, Kryzys dopiero przed nami, Tygodnik Idei, Europa Dziennik, 9-10 May 2009
34 This type of wording should probably not be found in this work, but I was provoked by the statement of
one of the professors of economics, who often complained that "the banks are doing him in." It is
interesting, whether when the products offered by banks and other financial institutions could achieve
above-average profits, their customers also feel "done in".
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rating industry. These regulations should encourage transparency in their functioning. Not just the
rating itself is important, but also the way it is determined.
The second line of action concerns adequate supervision. The financial sector must be properly
supervised. This would make early detection of threats and countering them effective. Erroneous or
insufficient information about the financial position of enterprises35 may delay the market's
reaction. Delay increases the violence of the reaction.
CRISIS MAP
35 Companies should publish financial statements, verified by independent auditors.
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I. REASONS OF INSTABILITY OF THE CAPITAL MARKETS
1. PRIMARY CAUSES
Conflict of agency (costs of agency)
· change in ownership structure - Separation of ownership from management - acceptance of
excessive risk-taking by managers due to lack of responsibility (distorted ratio of risk to rate of
return), shortening the investment horizon, short-term increase in the company value at any price
· irresponsible actions of state - The state can also be seen as an agent. It is a specific agent.
However, states have enormous resources at their disposal, often not very well managed and are
not generally liable for its actions. The State does not function well as a business owner and
regulator. Pursuing expansionary economic policy stimulates excess demand, leading to
overvaluation of securities and real estate and speculation
2. SECONDARY CAUSES
· technical progress (Internet, computerization, telecommunications) - improved access to
information facilitated investment decisions
· liberalization - facilitated movement of capital on a large scale
· development of capital market:
- Development of institutional investors administrations with enormous resources aimed at short-
term gains
- The dynamic development of financial instruments to facilitate the creation and movement of
capital (leverage is easier) and the relocation and reduction (often illusory) of risk
II. ATEMPTS TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS
1. ATTEMPTS TO DATE (REDUCING COST OF AGENCY)
· Market - Aggressive incentive systems
· State  - Regulations (prudential, concerning information disclosure, protecting the interests
of different shareholders
                   - Providing financial support to vulnerable subjects (socializing losses, spreading
responsibility, encouraging similar actions in the future)
 2. BASIC DIRECTION OF PROPOSED CHANGES
· Better accountability (Eliminating the asymmetry of responsibility) of managers and
other capital market participants for their incorrect decisions (appropriate actions of both
market and state)
· better regulation concerning the protection of investors and the transmission of reliable
information, coupled with effective enforcement (appropriate action of the State)
· the creation of supranational supervision (Appropriate action of groups of countries and
international organizations)
15
A major factor in the development of each country is an appropriate legal and institutional
system that protects investors (Corporate Governance.) The possibility of raising capital by
companies in foreign markets depends on, inter alia, reducing the risk of expropriation of
shareholders by managers. Research shows that the development of legal protection of investors is
an important factor in the development of financial markets. Outside investors financing a
company are usually concerned that the benefits they expect may not materialize, because the main
shareholders and managers can expropriate them (by, for instance, "stealing the profits" selling
production or assets at depressed prices to other companies controlled by them36).  In  such  a
situation money will not return money to investors, but increase the benefits of insiders (managers
and major shareholders)37.
Better protection38 makes investors willing to pay more for domestic assets. They pay more
because they believe that better legal protection will result in a higher return, higher gains on
interest or dividends. Securities prices grow in such circumstances39. Weak protection, on the other
hand, increases the risks of expropriation of shareholders by entrepreneurs who control the
company40. Empirical studies therefore confirm that better legal protection of shareholders results
in a higher valuation of the assets of enterprises.
Not only relevant legal regulations are important, or the creation of appropriate institutions, but
also and above all, adequate law enforcement. The third priority concerns, therefore, an effective
system of criminal liability and civil liability.
Previous experiences in various countries show that there were some shortcomings in all these
areas. However, in my view, the greatest, problem is the lack of an effective system of civil and
criminal liability. This includes two aspects: responsibility and efficiency in its enforcement.
Chart 4. Main areas of state activity in increasing effectiveness of capital markets.
Source: Own work
Shaping conditions of better
access to information
and adequate
corporate governance
in companies  (regulations,
institutions)
Directions
of State
intervention
Appropriate system
supervision over the
(control
of compliance
regulatio
Effective system of
criminal and civil
liability
36 Other forms of action to the detriment of small shareholders may be excessive wage, or the hiring of
family members or friends who do not have the appropriate qualifications.
37] R.  La  Porta,  F.  Lopez-de-Silanes,  A.  Shleifer,  R.  Vishny, Investor Protection and Corporate
Governance, P. 2
38 The literature indicates that in countries whose legal system is based on civil law, there is greater state
intervention in economic activity, and consequently weaker protection of private property, than in systems
based on common law.
39 It is worth remembering especially when discussing privatization and valuation of companies.
40 R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, R. Vishny, Investor Protection and Corporate
Governance, Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, 2000.
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As regards the scope of  a  manager’s  responsibility,  I  would point  to  two basic  problems.  The
first concerns the limitation of liability to direct losses caused by their decisions. And this losses
should not be seen as deterioration in the financial results of the company only, because in such a
situation a manager can at most lose his job. Responsibility usually occurs only when there is the
so-called intentional act, or deliberate violation of specific provisions. Taking excessive investment
risk and potential losses due to this do not cause negative consequences for managers. There is an
obvious asymmetry of responsibility. In the event of bad decisions shareholders lose capital
invested by them, and managers at most lose jobs. When, on the other hand, they take the right
decision, they get a huge bonus. Is it not possible to implement a solution whereby the deterioration
of the results leads to giving back their earlier bonuses? In this situation, their inclination towards
risk would be much lower, they would carefully approach the different financial instruments.
The managers’ incentive systems should therefore be so modified, as to encourage them to take
long-term action. This can be achieved through:
- withdrawal of ”golden parachutes” and guaranteed bonuses paid in the case of dismissal for
poor performance or violation of law,
- reducing the amount of bonuses in relation to the basic salary,
- deferred bonuses related to future results,
- possibility to demand repayment of the bonus, when future results turn out to be below
expectations (extension of the assessment period)
- annual bonuses in escrow accounts, which may withdrawn in case of losses.
The State should establish regulations to facilitate or even impose the obligation to apply such
solutions. The criterions of selection and responsibilities of members of supervisory boards must be
also changed. This could result in that fewer politicians and public officials, having neither
qualifications nor motivation for proper supervision, and interested only in the easy extra income,
would apply for seats in the supervisory boards.
The second problem concerns the scope of entities subject to this responsibility. Undoubtedly,
the negative role of the managers is not subject to any doubt. But it must be kept in mind, that the
State, investors, and borrowers, are also responsible. Too easily and too often we release these
other parties from liability.  Such an approach makes it difficult to introduce various solutions to
eliminate anomalies in the capital market. Frequent changes in regulations (taxes) affect the
investment perspective shortening it, and increase speculation that is leading to instability of
capital markets.
Schema 3. Consequences of lack of accountability for decisions made
Managers Supervisory Boards State Small investors
- taking excessive risk -improper supervision -improper macro-economic policy -imprudent investment
-excessive leveraging
- improper selection of board
members -improper regulations
-conviction that there is gain without
risk
-manipulating information
-improper supervision of State
companies
-exerting pressure on managers, often
inconsciously, to increase return
-populism
Source: own.
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Enforcement of liability, set aside concerns about its scope and subjective, leaves much to be
desired.
 Activities to increase the competitiveness of enterprises are important. One can speak
about a new concept of economic policy of the State in conditions of globalisation, which is
designed to shift the emphasis from direct government regulation of economic mechanisms, to
creating conditions for increasing competitiveness41. Businesses gain more from reducing red tape,
increasing the transparency of regulations, limiting the amount of changes in the rules, than from
obtaining new subsidies, especially when, moreover, resources are becoming scarce. Many
countries have taken active policy aimed at increasing the competitiveness of enterprises and
economies.  Within  the  framework  of  macroeconomic  policy,  measures  are  taken  to  shape  the
structure of the economy and its exports in line with trends of changes in global demand. The
opening of the national economy to the external markets offers opportunities to increase economic
growth in the long term. Raising the international competitiveness of enterprises should be
supported, i.a., by the expansion and maintenance of modern infrastructure. Developing economies
and businesses increasingly require a higher level of applied technology and increasingly high
qualifications. The state plays an important role in their development.
Other activities are related to the creation of conditions for fair competition. I.e., monopolies in
different areas of the economy should be restricted. An important issue is to reduce the size of
companies. Situations, where firms are too big to fail should be avoided. Institutions offering safe
instruments should be banned from carrying out activities with a high risk. Analysing the different
solutions used previously we should, in my opinion, consider the regulations introduced in 1933 in
the United States; I mean the Glass-Steagall Act, separating commercial banking, investment and
insurance services. Such separation allows the development of appropriate regulatory instruments
and separation of safe activities from the more risky ones (speculative, easily leveraged). This
would reduce the negative effects of transferring the results of excessively risky actions to those
who often over many years saved, for instance in banks in banks (not willing to take too high
risks). The appropriate course of action is deposit insurance up to certain amounts. This will
increase transparency and competition on the market. There is also a need to take action to
harmonize tax systems. Such actions are taken by the OECD and the European Union.
Since excessive leverage, excessive risk taking, and manipulation of information are largely a
consequence of the separation of ownership from management, putting in place measures that
prevent excessive fragmentation of ownership should be considered, at least in relation to
companies that raise equity in a public market. Regulations that block the effective impact of
shareholders on the company must be changed. A striking example of the pathology occurring
here is the opposition of the largest owner of Kraft, Warren Buffett  (Owner of Kraft by a proxy,
Berkshire Hathaway), against the takeover of Cadbury. The opposition turned out to be
unsuccessful, since shareholders did not have real influence on such an important decision made by
"their" company. In the U.S., already at the beginning of the 1930s regulations, which led to the
growth of influence of the managers, often at the expense of the interest of owners, were
introduced. The powers of the owners must be increased; regulations that increase the alienation of
the owners of public companies have to be reduced.
Politicians are often reluctant to such changes. And they introduce laws, which deprive them of
control over markets with reluctance42 , forcing the transfer of control to financiers. Resistance also
occurs on the part of families that control large corporations. Family property, which is prevalent in
41 The New Political Economy of Globalisation,  Vol  I,  Part  II: The State, Ed. R. Higgott, Payne A.,
2001.
42  Such control may be effected, e.g., by large corporations. In many countries, politicians interfer in the
management of the companies in which the state has a stake.
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many Asian countries, is regarded as one of the factors that contributed to the financial crisis in the
area. Managers of big companies, that are financed through internal sources or through affiliated
banks43 are also opposed to such reforms. This makes much of the bank loans go, in these
countries, to several major companies, which hinders access to finance for small firms that could
compete with large companies. The protection of foreign investors, while contributing to the
development of capital markets and facilitating the funding of small businesses, is at the same time
a major threat to the inefficient firms, which must lead them to block such reforms. It is often
easier to use political influence to block the reforms than to take action to improve efficiency. Poor
corporate management of such companies provides safe funding, secure policy and secure markets.
They are therefore keen to keep the existing system44. Difficult start of many less developed
countries,  due  to,  inter  alia,  lower  competitiveness,  conditions  the  adaptation  processes  in  a
particular manner. This does not mean, however, that these countries are predetermined to be
losers.
You cannot focus on regulating the names, you need to regulate risk. Restricting or prohibiting
certain instruments (securitisation, short-selling) is not a solution, but ways to reduce excessive risk
should be found. Moreover, the steps currently taken by the U.S. government do not solve any
problems in my opinion45, and only perpetuate the existing anomalies and accelerate the next crisis.
Rescue (support) of private institutions by the state increases the risk of actions known as "moral
hazard".
One must always remember that too much detail in regulations reduces the flexibility of
the market.  Action  must  be  taken,  for  instance,  so  that  reduced  tax  rates  are  accompanied  by
increased revenues for the budget, or at least not by a significant drop in these revenues. This may
happen when the tax reduction is be accompanied by an increase in economic activity. This is not
an easy task and there is no automatism here. The history of individual countries provides ample
evidence  that  in  some  situations,  tax  cuts  led  to  an  increase  in  activity,  but  there  are  also  cases
where there was no such link. This is due to the fact, that investment decisions are conditioned by
many factors, not just the amount of taxes.
It is not passive adaptation, as some suggest, to the demands of capital, that matters, but
knowledge of mechanisms that decide about a specific behaviors of that capital. Capital
movements, including speculation, are subordinate to the objectives of the owners of capital.
Understanding the determinants of these processes will make it easier to adapt to them and benefit
from opportunities associated with this.
The error of submission, long known in the economy still valid; rationality at the micro level is
not the same as rationality at the macro level. Reflections on changes in the state's role can not be
treated here as an argument that this error does not exist. This problem occurs all the time, in many
cases even intensifies.  The market alone will not solve this problem. Dilemmas relate only to how
the state can help reduce market failures46.
Due to the excessive regulation in the European Union, it will be harder to get out of
recession. Ideas for additional regulation (increased control over banks, barriers to investment,
protection of different industries by the state) have the potential to widen the gap between the EU
and America in the future.
A greater government intervention in the economy may take such forms as in the U.S. (plan of
Treasury Secretary Paulson), France under Sarkozy's leadership, or Switzerland. This third
example is more market-friendly, more thought out. In Switzerland, before the intervention
43 C. Mayer New issues in corporate finance, "European Economic Review" 1998, No. 32, p. 1167-1188.
44 R.L. La Porta, et al. ... Investor Protection, p. 25
45 I am thinking long term. In the short term, you can talk about some of the apparent benefits such as
slowing decline in production, the number of bankruptcies, etc.
46 In this work, of course, the considerations do not apply to the market as such, but generally they are
confined to the capital market.
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occurred, authorities explained by what results they expect to achieve, what steps will be taken
and when the State will withdraw from intervention.
In conclusion, it must be said that as the capital market develops, the state largely loses its
ability to act. To attract capital, the state must submit to the requirements of capital. Taking action
unfavorable to capital means that capital leaves (this is a kind of punishment). From this point of
view we can say that the state loses its significance, because it may not take certain actions at
will. Incompleteness of political and economic globalisation promotes the growing strength of the
capital market. The flow of labor remains blocked, while capital is on the move.  Despite these
limitations of the States’ ability to act, there are new trends and the impact of new challenges.
Without the active role of the State the adverse consequences of development of capital markets
cannot be restricted. These measures must however be carefully considered and subject to certain
logic. It is essential to identify the causes of instability.
4. Incompleteness of globalisation - the need to create a supranational
supervision
Widespread liberalization of capital markets led to the fact that these markets largely slipped
out from any control. Economic globalisation is not accompanied by simultaneous globalisation
in the political sphere, which causes that we can speak of the incompleteness of globalisation47.
As already mentioned an important factor in the volatility of capital markets is taking
excessive risks and information asymmetry. The inability of the market itself to eliminate these
causes of weakness points to the need for greater regulation and supervision by the State.
Many point out, that a principal mean to combat the crisis is restructuring the regulatory
oversight of securities market. There are some indications that it should be more systemic and
flexible, so that it can respond more quickly if it appears that some measures introduced cause
unintended consequences. The need for a systematic approach results from the interaction
between international markets. Attempts to regulate the global flow at the local level proved to be
ineffective. You can talk about "competitive speculative arbitrage," or competition between
national regulators for foreign capital.
It is also indicated ever more often, that a new international financial architecture needs to be
agreed, however, on a super-national basis. Already many years ago H. Kaufman proposed to
create a global institution to exercise supervision over both commercial banks and non-bank
financial intermediaries48. It seems that this will be very difficult, due to different interests and
diverging views on these issues.  In the meantime, extensive use of already existing international
institutions is paramount49.
One of the key problems is that, to date, no international actor that can identify the global
targets developed. There are neither rules, nor institutions provided with adequate means to force
market actors to comply with such rules. Any discussions on this issue reveal a huge conflict of
interest in the global economy. A further asymmetry between the capacity of the state and
expectations for coordination reveals itself also.
47 For more on this topic see works by W. Szymanski, who in addition to incompleteness in the political
sphere also points to the incompleteness in the economic sphere, namely the lack of freedom of
movement of labor and agricultural products. This is due to the protection of their interests by the highly
developed countries.
48 H. Kaufman, Developing the West Global Financial Crises, "Washington Post, 28/01/1998.
49 Several institutions may be named, i.a.: Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS),
International Association of Securities Commissions (IAIS), International Accounting Standards
Committee (IASC), Global Forum on Company Management,, standardized data system about the
development of individual states (SDDS).
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Although the institutions subject to supervision operate globally, each country has so far
implemented financial supervision on its own. It happened also, that there were inconsistencies
between the different national regulations. This resulted in that the foreign activities of financial
institutions often slipped out of any control. Operating in various markets simultaneously created
possibilities of distorting the picture of the financial situation of an institution. Additional
problems are associated with tax havens, where supervision practically does not exist. This makes
not only tax evasion, but also disrespecting prudential regulations, relatively easy.
Eliminating these problems requires the creation of supranational supervision that should have
the right to review the activities of the entire financial groups, regardless of where their business
is conducted.
Attempts to reduce the impact of crises often result in an increased state interventionism.
Protectionism and state intervention in the economy grow, which greatly impedes the
introduction of trans-national solutions. This suggests that such solutions should be introduced in
more peaceful times, but unfortunately then the desire (compulsion) to introduce them is also
much smaller.
Existing institutions - the World Bank and IMF are not sufficiently representative to obtain
legitimacy necessary for global management. One of the lines of action is taking steps aimed at
reforming the existing institutions in order to make them more efficient and reliable. This,
however, requires a community of interests. Activities can be effective only if they give a global
dimension.  In  the  case  of  the  IMF  the  main  concern  is  its  rather  low  acceptability,  due  to  its
record of activities. Assistance provided by this institution in many cases contributed indirectly to
insure (reduce) the risk of the capital market. Investors expected, that should problems in
individual  countries  arise,  the  IMF will  come  to  their  aid,  and  hence  were  willing  to  accept  an
apparently higher risk. I do not think, however, that Stiglitz was right when he argued that the
IMF is not guided by the desire to assist such countries in trouble, and takes action that only
allows highly developed countries to withdraw their capital50.
The void caused by lack of adequate systemic solutions was partially filled by the creation of
ad hoc agreements on cooperation between groups of countries, taking over the role of "steering
committees in the world economy" (G7, G8, and G20)51. Several meetings, during which it was
attempted to determine the directions of future changes, were held. G-20 summits took place in
November 2008 in Washington and in London in April 2009. Also, very to the point, during these
meetings it was admitted that the effectiveness of the proposed solutions requires the involvement
of many more countries, not just the most developed ones. It should therefore be a G-192, but it's
hard to imagine that such a broad forum could take any decisions.
Summit in Washington
Heads of G-20 states52, at a meeting held in November 2008 in Washington pledged to take
action in several areas ranging from greater market transparency, strengthening the control
system, and ending with the reform of international financial institutions.
1/ improving market transparency:
- financial supervisory authorities are to cooperate with the private sector in properly
implementing new accounting rules,
- requirements concerning the content of reports published by financial institutions on their
financial condition will be tightened,
- supervision will ensure completeness and correctness of these reports,
50 J. Stiglitz, Globalizacja, PWN, Warsaw 2004, p. 28-36.
51 J. W. Gołębiowski, J.W.Gołębiowski, Global Governance, Koncepcje-doświadczenia-perspektywy.
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2 / strengthening the control system:
- system of financial market regulation should prevent the crisis from spreading to other sectors
of economy,
- international rating agencies will be reformed, so that they can provide objective information
to the market. These agencies will be subject to monitoring, and the obligation of registration,
- financial institutions should hold capital reserves, such as not to undermine confidence in the
banking systems. The amount of a bank's capital will depend on the structure of its loan
portfolio,
- a strong system of supervision of the liquidity of international financial markets will be
created,
- a reform of bankruptcy laws applicable to international corporations will be carried out.
3 / market management:
- bank risk management procedures need to be strengthened. Financial institutions should
improve internal controls,
- procedures to better manage liquidity will be created,
- protection of the markets from turbulence should be an objective of the banks, and therefore
they should reform their management systems with this aim in mind,
- risk management systems in relation to structured products will be created.
4 / promotion of the integrity of financial markets:
- the main objective of the State is to protect investors and consumers,
- the threat to the stability of international markets will be eliminated, through increasing
cooperation between national financial supervision authorities,
- fight against money laundering and financial terrorism will be expanded.
5 / reform of international financial institutions:
- Financial Stability Forum will be expanded and new members admitted,
- IMF should become a major center for the analysis of the current crisis and will develop
appropriate conclusions,
- capital resources of the World Bank Group should be increased,
- credit markets will be more accessible to developing countries,
- Bretton Woods system should be reformed so as to correspond with the evolution of the
global economy, the role of developing countries is to be raised,
- IMF surveillance over all countries will be strengthened, and more attention paid to financial
sector,
- developed countries should increase their role in supporting economic growth in poorer
regions of the world.
The summit final communiqué stated that, with deteriorating economic conditions around the
world, there is a need for a broader policy response, based on a closer economic cooperation, in
order to restore growth, to avoid a negative domino effect, and to support the emerging-market
economies and developing countries.
Other regulatory areas discussed are:
1.  Valuation of assets by the so-called fair value – valuation of assets at market prices,
regardless of their degree of liquidity. Listed companies using International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS) estimate the financial instruments (derivatives, bonds and others)
at fair value. In the case of companies not complying with these standards valuation is based
on historical value (the value of expenses incurred) The use of fair value causes unrealized
gains (gains on valuation of assets) in the companies in good times, and during a crisis there
are losses resulting from lower valuation. Losses from the valuation, when their level exceeds
the value of equity, are the basis for the bankruptcy of companies, which significantly
contributes to deepening the crisis. This is particularly true when, to cover losses, other assets
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are sold quickly. Both valuation gains and losses are unrealized values, which show the
differences between the historical costs of acquisition (construction) of assets, and their
market value at the balance sheet. Gains and losses realized may vary significantly from the
unrealized gains and losses (resulting from valuation). Valuations are subject to large
fluctuations. Changes in the market are automatically reflected in the valuations. The use of
historical prices, however, reduces the transparency of financial statements and makes it
difficult to compare the financial situation of companies in different periods or to compare
different companies.
2.  Greater transparency of banks, private equity and hedge funds. These institutions, unlike the
so-called public companies, have limited publication obligations. This reduces transparency
and comparability.
In assessing the setting of different peaks, it should be noted that the root causes of instability
of capital markets were not fully realized, and without this it is difficult to propose appropriate
solutions. What was proposed is, in my view, incomplete and too vague, and as usual the problem
lies in the details. It is difficult, on the other hand, to imagine that in a crisis situation, with so
many conflicts of interest, such a group could come up with something more concrete. I do not
think that these meetings could soon translate into practical solutions. Some changes probably
will occur, but they will be insufficient to face the next problems. Again, there are demands to
introduce a Tobin tax, but its implementation does not appear possible.
 A  significant  change  is  a  departure  from  the  spirit  of  liberalism,  which  largely  lost  its
monopoly (at least verbally). We must however add that blaming everything on neo-liberalism is
wrong. Not neo-liberalism is the problem, but rather a weakness of market mechanisms. The
market coordination is weak. Lack of accountability of decision makers, resulting in excessive
speculative capital movements, and speculative bubbles, does not encounter appropriate market
barriers or state regulations. Market failures can be dealt with by appropriate state
intervention. However, the weakness of states can not be solved by increasing the role of the
state.
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